It is well established that investment fundamentals, such as earnings and cash flows, can explain only a small proportion of the variation in stock returns. We find that investor recognition of a firm's stock can explain relatively more of the variation in stock returns. Consistent with Merton's (1987) theoretical analysis, we show that (i) contemporaneous stock returns are positively related to changes in investor recognition, (ii) future stock returns are negatively related to changes in investor recognition, (iii) the above relations are stronger for stocks with greater idiosyncratic risk and (iv) corporate investment and financing activities are both positively related to changes in investor recognition. Our research suggests that investors and managers who are concerned with firm valuation should consider investor recognition in addition to accounting information and related investment fundamentals. We thank Alon Brav for sharing his idiosyncratic risk data with us. We are grateful for the excellent research assistance of Peter Demerjian.
Introduction
Starting with Ball and Brown (1968) , a large body of accounting literature explores the relation between accounting information and stock returns. The general conclusion emerging from research in this area is that accounting information explains a surprisingly low proportion of the variation in stock returns. In summarizing early evidence, Lev (1989) finds that earnings can explain no more than 10% of the variation in stock returns and concludes that earnings are of limited usefulness to investors. More recently, Liu and Thomas (2000) extend early research to incorporate changes in expectations of future abnormal earnings and are able to explain up to 30% of the variation in stock returns.
Yet, the majority of the variation in stock returns remains unexplained by fundamental variables such as cash flows and earnings.
In this paper we investigate the ability of Merton's (1987) model of capital market equilibrium under incomplete information to explain the remaining variation in stock returns. Merton shows that, holding fundamentals constant, firm value is increasing in the degree of investor recognition of the firm. The key behavioral assumption invoked by Merton's (1987) model is that investors only use securities that they know about in constructing their optimal portfolios. If relatively few investors know about a particular security, then the only way for markets to clear is for these investors take large undiversified positions in the security. These investors then require an expected return premium to compensate them for the increased idiosyncratic risk associated with their positions. Merton refers to the number of investors who know about a security as the degree of 'investor recognition' for that security and models the resulting capital market equilibrium. The key predictions of his model are (i) security value is increasing in investor recognition, (ii) expected return is decreasing in investor recognition, (iii) the above two relations are increasing in the security's idiosyncratic risk, and (iv) financing and investing activities in the underlying firm are increasing in investor recognition. Our empirical results are uniformly consistent with these predictions and are both economically and statistically significant.
Our results make several contributions to existing research. First, our findings contribute to research on the determinants of stock returns. We show that investor recognition is an important determinant of expected returns and that innovations in investor recognition appear to be more important than earnings news in explaining contemporaneous stock returns. These results highlight the importance of investor recognition as a determinant of firm-level expected return news and contribute to the literature on the drivers of firm-level stock returns (e.g., Lev, 1989; Roll, 1989; Liu and Thomas, 2000; Vuolteenaho, 2002) . The investor recognition hypothesis also explains Vuolteenaho's (2002) finding that expected return news is relatively more important in small firms. Vuolteenaho finds that the variance of cash flow news is greater in small firms, causing them to have increased idiosyncratic risk. Both Merton's (1987) theoretical analysis and our results find that the effect of investor recognition on expected returns is increasing in idiosyncratic risk.
Second, we reconcile conflicting evidence from previous research regarding the relation between investor recognition and future stock returns. Early research by Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) finds evidence of the predicted negative relation. More recent research by Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) provides contradictory evidence of a positive relation between changes in investor recognition and future returns. We document that changes in investor recognition are positively autocorrelated over short horizons. We further show that Chen et al.'s evidence of a positive relation between changes in investor recognition and future stock returns is attributable to this positive autocorrelation combined with the positive relation between changes in investor recognition and contemporaneous stock returns. After controlling for autocorrelation in changes in investor recognition, we find that changes in investor recognition have the predicted negative relation with future stock returns.
Third, our results suggest that investor recognition is an important determinant of corporate financial policy. We find that changes in investor recognition are strongly related to contemporaneous and future corporate financing and investing activities. This evidence corroborates Brennan and Tamorowski's (2000) conclusions regarding the role of corporate investor relations activities as a tool for lowering the cost of capital in firms that are raising capital.
Finally, our results suggest that investor recognition may help explain a number of 'anomalies' in stock returns. Prior research shows that corporate financing and investing activities are negatively related to future stock returns (see Ritter, 2003; and Titman, Wei and Xie, 2004) and that short-horizon stock returns exhibit positive 'momentum' (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) . Investor recognition is related to each of these variables in such a way that their relations with future returns can be explained by the investor recognition hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed description of the investor recognition hypothesis and develops our empirical predictions. Section 3 describes our data, section 4 presents our results and section 5 concludes.
Hypothesis Development
The idea that neglected stocks earn a return premium over recognized stocks has been in existence for many years (e.g., Arbel, Carvell and Strebel, 1983) . Merton (1987) develops an asset pricing model that explains this apparent pricing anomaly. The key difference between Merton's model and standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM is that Merton's model assumes that investors only know about a subset of the available securities, and that these subsets differ across investors. This assumption means that some stocks are known to relatively few investors. Investors in these 'neglected' securities must therefore hold undiversified portfolios and so require a return premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk. The key implications of the model are that (i) the value of a security is increasing in the number of investors who know about the security, and (ii) the expected return on a security is decreasing in the number of investors who know about the security; and (iii) the above two relations are stronger for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk. Merton refers to his model as a model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Subsequent research generally refers to the model and its implications as the 'investor recognition hypothesis'. Merton (1987) also provides an extension of his basic model that examines the impact of endogenizing the choice of investor recognition on a firm's investment and financing decisions. This extension indicates that changes in investor recognition will be positively correlated with corporate financing and investing activities. If exogenous events cause investor recognition of a firm's securities to increase, then the firm's cost of capital will fall and so its optimal level of financing and investing activities will increase.
If exogenous events cause an increase in financing and investing activities, then the benefits from having a lower cost of capital will increase, so efforts to generate investor recognition of the firm's securities will increase.
Our empirical examination of the investor recognition hypothesis focuses on testing all four of the predictions identified above:
P1: Security value is increasing in investor recognition.
P2: Expected return is decreasing in investor recognition.
P3: The above two relations are stronger for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk.
P4: Financing and investing are increasing in investor recognition.
A number of previous studies provide empirical tests of subsets of these predictions. One line of research focuses on P1 by examining the impact of events that increase investor recognition on firm value. Events studied include exchange listings (Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; and Foerster and Karolyi, 1999) , initiation of analyst coverage (Irvine, 2003) , addition to stock indices (Shleifer, 1986; Chen, Noronha and Singal, 2004) , reduction of the minimum unit of trading (Amihud, Mendelson, and Uno, 1999) , hiring of investor relations firms (Bushee and Miller, 2005) , increases in advertising expenditures (Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston, 2004) , and periods of unusual trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin, 2001; Kaniel, Li and Starks, 2003) .
These studies generally find that events increasing investor recognition lead to increases in security value. We contribute to this literature by constructing a comprehensive measure of investor recognition and evaluating the relative importance of investor recognition in driving stock returns.
A second line of research focuses on P2 by examining the association between changes in investor recognition and future stock returns. The evidence from this research is mixed. Early research by Arbel, Carvell and Strebel (1983) uses the number of institutional investors as a measure of investor recognition and finds evidence of the hypothesized negative relation between investor recognition and future stock returns.
More recently, Chen, Hong and Stein (2002) find evidence of a positive relation between the change in the number of institutional holders and future stock returns. This finding is inconsistent with the negative relation predicted by the investor recognition hypothesis.
Using a similar methodology to Chen, et al., Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2005) find evidence of the hypothesized negative relation using a sample of Swedish stocks. 1 We contribute to this literature by reconciling the inconsistent evidence in Chen et al. with the investor recognition hypothesis. We show that changes in investor recognition are positively autocorrelated. Since P1 predicts that changes in investor recognition are positively correlated with contemporaneous returns, it is important to control for this autocorrelation when evaluating the relation between changes in investor recognition and future stock returns. After controlling for autocorrelation, we find that changes in investor recognition are negatively related to future stock returns, as predicted by P2.
A third line of research focuses on the relation between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns and is indirectly related to P3. This research focuses on estimating the unconditional association between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns. The intuition behind this research is that since many investors hold undiversified portfolios, idiosyncratic risk should be priced. Results of this research are mixed. An early and influential study by Fama and MacBeth (1973) finds no role for idiosyncratic risk in explaining future stock returns. However, a more recent study by Malkiel and Xu (2004) finds evidence of the predicted positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns. We contribute to this literature by providing more powerful tests of the hypothesized relation between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns. Intuitively, our P3 examines whether idiosyncratic risk is more strongly positively related to future stock returns in stocks that are held by relatively undiversified investors (i.e., in stocks with low investor recognition). Our results are strongly consistent with P3 and corroborate and extend the findings in Malkiel and Xu (2004) .
Finally, to our knowledge there is no research that directly examines our P4. There are, however, numerous studies that examine the relation between corporate activities and future stock returns. Ritter (2003) summarizes the findings or a large body of evidence identifying a negative relation between corporate financing activities and future stock returns. Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) document a negative relation between capital expenditures and future stock returns. Our predictions P4 and P2 combine to suggest that the investor recognition hypothesis may provide an explanation for the negative stock returns following these corporate financing and investing activities. P4 predicts that investor recognition is positively related to corporate financing and investing activities.
P2 predicts that investor recognition is negatively related to stock future returns. These two predictions combine to generate the observed negative relation between corporate investing and financing activities and future stock returns.
Data and Variable Measurement
Our tests require that we develop an empirical proxy for the investor recognition construct developed by Merton (1987) . Merton's model consists of a large number of investors with identical initial wealths and he defines investor recognition of a security as the fraction of investors who know about the security. There are several issues to consider in developing an empirical proxy for Merton's construct. First, we cannot directly observe how many investors 'know about' a particular security. We can, however, observe the number of investors who are actually invested in a security. It seems reasonable to argue that the number of investors who know about a security is increasing in the number of investors that own the security. We therefore use ownership of a security as a proxy for knowledge of a security.
A second issue arising in the construction of an empirical proxy for investor recognition is that Merton's model assumes that all investors have identical initial wealths. This assumption is almost certainly violated in practice. Merton notes that extending his model to the more realistic case of a non-uniform distribution of initial wealth changes the appropriate investor recognition construct from the proportion of investors who know about the security to the fraction of total wealth owned by investors who know about the security. It is difficult for us to measure the wealth levels of investors, but we can restrict our analysis to relatively wealthy investors. We do so by limiting our measure of investor recognition to investors filing Form 13F with the SEC.
13F filings are required on a quarterly basis from all institutional investors with more than $100 million of securities under their discretion. We therefore use the proportion of 13F filers holding a long position in that security as our empirical proxy for investor recognition.
A third issue that arises in measuring investor recognition is that Merton's model predicts that firm value will be influenced by a host of other factors, including the magnitude of the firm's future cash flows, the exposure of the security to common factors and the size of the firm. It is difficult to control for these factors (particularly expected cash flows) in the cross-section, but it is easier to control for changes in a given firm over time. Accordingly, we conduct our empirical tests using a changes specification. Testing our predictions in changes instead of levels should increase the power of our tests by reducing omitted variable problems related to these other factors. Thus, our empirical tests employ the change in the proportion of 13-F filers holding a security as a proxy for the change in the investor recognition of that security. To ensure that our measure captures changes in the breadth of ownership rather than changes in the universe of institutions covered by our database, we compute this variable using only 13F filers that exist in our database in both quarters t and t-1.
A fourth issue with our measure of investor recognition is that it makes the assumption that investors only know about securities that they hold. If an investor buys a security that they didn't previously own, it seems reasonable to argue that they only just learned about that security. But if an investor sells a security that they previously owned, it is a stretch to argue that they forgot about that security.
2 Because the purchase of a security that was not previously owned is a cleaner measure of change in investor (COMPUSTAT item 77), deflated by average total assets (COMPUSTAT item 44). We deduct depreciation and amortization to control for investment that simply maintains productive capacity. All data items are from the COMPUSTAT quarterly files, and we cumulate across the trailing four quarters to measure these variables over annual measurement intervals. We also follow the convention of winsorizing these variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the impact of extreme outliers.
Results

Descriptive Statistics
Institutional ownership data is available on a quarterly basis. In order to study the effects of autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH, we conduct our empirical tests using has been a slight tendency for institutions to diversify their holdings over our sample period. Note that ΔBREADTH tends to be right skewed, indicating that a small number of stocks experience extremely large increases in institutional ownership.
In order for empirical tests of P2 to be well-specified, it is important to control for autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH. of autocorrelation that lasts for up to three years. In contrast to panel A, however, the autocorrelation is not much stronger at one lead/lag than it is at three leads/lags. Figure 1 illustrates the autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH by plotting the mean values of order autocorrelations using annual data (Pearson≈17%, Spearman≈11%) and also indicates that these positive autocorrelations persist at higher orders.
In summary, ΔBREADTH exhibits strong autocorrelation using both the quarterly and annual measurement intervals. It is important to control for this autocorrelation when testing P2. Recall that P2 predicts that ΔBREADTH is negatively related to future returns. However, P1 predicts that ΔBREADTH is positively related to contemporaneous returns. The combination of P1 and positive autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH leads to the prediction of a positive relation between ΔBREADTH and future returns. The relation between ΔBREADTH and future returns is therefore predicted to be negative by P2, but this relation is likely to be confounded by the positive relation resulting from P1 in combination with positive serial correlation in ΔBREADTH. Thus, well-specified tests of P2 require controls for autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH. 
Investor Recognition and Firm Value
The first key prediction of Merton's model is that security value is increasing in investor recognition (our P1). We test this prediction by examining the relation between ΔBREADTH and contemporaneous changes in security value. We measure changes in security value using size-adjusted returns, as defined in section 3. Table 3 reports average size-adjusted returns in event time for portfolios of firms formed on decile ranks of ΔBREADTH in period t. Panel A of table 3 presents the results using quarterly measurement intervals for quarters t-4 through t+4. P1 predicts that average returns will be increasing in the rank of ΔBREADTH during quarter t. The results are strongly consistent with this prediction, with returns increasing monotonically across ΔBREADTH deciles. Returns for the lowest ΔBREADTH decile are -11.0% and returns for the highest ΔBREADTH decile are 14.4%, giving a return spread across the extreme deciles of 25.4%.
The second key prediction from Merton's model is that expected return is decreasing in investor recognition (our P2). , Foster, 1977) . We include both the current quarter and the prior quarter because we measure stock returns over fiscal quarter intervals. During a fiscal quarter, earnings for the previous quarter will typically be announced. In addition, it is possible that information will be released about earnings for the current quarter (e.g., management forecasts). We therefore expect both the current and lagged unexpected quarterly These results confirm that the relation between ΔBREADTH and contemporaneous stock returns does not arise because ΔBREADTH acts as a proxy for cash flow news. Rather, as predicted by Merton's model, it is consistent with a separate role for investor recognition in the determination of security values. Note also that the regression R 2 s indicate that investor recognition is even more important than cash flow news in explaining contemporaneous stock returns. In particular, the regressions in panel B
indicate that investor recognition explains 9.3% of the variation in contemporaneous quarterly returns, while cash flow news explains only 4.6%.
The final column of table 4 provides us with our first tests of P3. Recall that the intuition behind P1 and P2 is that investors in neglected stocks will require a risk premium to compensate them for bearing idiosyncratic risk. Ceteris paribus, greater idiosyncratic risk will command a greater the risk premium, and so P3 predicts that P1
will hold more strongly for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk. The regressions in the final column of table 4 include our measure of idiosyncratic risk (Rank i-risk) as both a main effect and an interactive effect with ΔBREADTH. If P1 holds more strongly for firms with greater idiosyncratic risk, then the coefficient on the interaction will be positive. Consistent with this prediction, the coefficient on the interaction is positive and highly statistically significant. Intuitively, this result says that increases in investor recognition cause much greater increases in firm value for stocks with higher idiosyncratic risk. Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of the economic magnitude of this result. This figure replicates figure 2, after decomposing the high and low ΔBREADTH deciles into two equal halves around the median value of Rank i-risk.
Thus, for each ΔBREADTH decile, we can separately track the return performance of the high idiosyncratic risk securities and the low idiosyncratic risk securities. The figure illustrates that contemporaneous returns are more than twice as pronounced for the high idiosyncratic risk subsamples on both the positive and negative sides. Thus, P3 is strongly supported in the context of P1. We test P3 in the context of P2 in the next subsection.
Investor Recognition and Future returns
The second key prediction of Merton's model is that expected return is decreasing in investor recognition (our P2). We test this prediction by examining the relation between ΔBREADTH and future size-adjusted stock returns. 5 We have already seen preliminary evidence relating to this prediction in 5 represents the contemporaneous change in our investor recognition measure, while ΔBREADTH QTR t represents the prior's quarter change, relative to the size-adjusted returns). Recall that P2 predicts that there will be a negative relation between ΔBREADTH t and future stock returns. We therefore predict that ΔBREADTH t will load with a negative coefficient. We include ΔBREADTH for periods t-1 and t+1 to control for autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH.
In order to illustrate the importance of controlling for autocorrelation, the first column of Panel A (quarterly) and Panel B (annual) of table 5 reports results from simple regressions of period t+1 returns on period t ΔBREADTH. Without controls for autocorrelation, the coefficient on ΔBREADTH t is positive and marginally significant using quarterly data and negative and insignificant using annual data. These results are broadly consistent with the results we observed in table 2 and figure 2 and with the results reported in Chen et al. (2002) . The second column adds controls for the autocorrelation by incorporating in the regression ΔBREADTH for period t-1 (two periods ago relative to return) and ΔBREADTH for period t+1 (contemporaneous change relative to return). Recall that ΔBREADTH for time t influences returns at t+1 through both the direct effect of Merton's hypothesis (high ΔBREADTH implies low expected return) and indirectly through the autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH (high period t ΔBREADTH implies high ΔBREADTH at period t+1 which implies high return at t+1).
To test for the former effect, we need to control for the latter one which we do by incorporating in the regression the period t+1 (contemporaneous) ΔBREADTH.
Consistent with P1, ΔBREADTH for period t+1 loads with a significantly positive coefficient. Moreover, consistent with P2, ΔBREADTH for period t now loads with a significantly negative coefficient. The change in results between columns 1 and 2
illustrates the importance of controlling for autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH in tests of P2.
These results lead us to conclude that that the positive correlation between ΔBREADTH and future returns in Chen et al. (2002) is likely to be driven by autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH rather than their 'differences of opinion' explanation.
The final column of table 5 provides comprehensive tests of P3. P3 predicts that both P1 and P2 will hold more strongly for securities with greater idiosyncratic risk.
Recall that with the quarterly data, the magnitude of the coefficient on the interactive term (-5.350 ) is about twice the coefficient on the main effect (-2.668), highlighting the importance of Rank i-risk in determining the strength of the negative relation between ΔBREADTH and future returns. The economic significance of these results is quite striking. For a security in the lowest Rank i-risk decile (Rank i-risk=-0.5), the coefficient on ΔBREADTH will be approximately zero, indicating that a change in ΔBREADTH has no effect on expected return. But for a security in the highest Rank i-risk decile (Rank i-risk=0.5), the coefficient on ΔBREADTH will be approximately -5. This means that an increase in ΔBREADTH of 0.01 (i.e., attracting an additional 1% of existing institutional investors)
reduces a security's expected return by 0.05 (i.e., the expected return goes down by 5% of security price). In summary, the results in table 5 are uniformly consistent with P3 and are highly economically significant.
The results in table 5 corroborate and extend recent research by Malkiel and Xu (2004) . That paper documents evidence of a positive relation between idiosyncratic risk and future stock returns. They argue that these results arise because undiversified investors demand a premium for holding idiosyncratic risk. Our results show that as ΔBREADTH increases (i.e., investors in a given stock become more diversified), the idiosyncratic risk premium falls, and this effect is more pronounced for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. between ΔBREADTH and future returns, we expect this relation to be symmetrical for both IN and OUT. In contrast, the investor recognition hypothesis predicts that after controlling for autocorrelation in ΔBREADTH, the negative relation between ΔBREADTH and future returns will be primarily attributable to IN as opposed to OUT. 
ΔBREADTH=IN-OUT). In other words, the positive association between ΔBREADTH
and contemporaneous returns is much stronger for IN than for OUT and the negative relation between ΔBREADTH and future returns is much stronger for IN than for OUT.
These results are uniformly consistent with the investor recognition hypothesis.
Investor Recognition and Real Corporate Activities
The fourth key prediction from Merton's model is that corporate financing and investing activities are positively related to changes in investor recognition (our P4).
Recall that the intuition behind this prediction is that the increased valuation and lower expected return accompanying an increase in investor recognition lead to a reduction in the cost of capital, making new financing and investing activities more attractive. An important research design issue in developing tests of P4 is the specification of the lag between changes in investor recognition and changes in firms' financing and investing activities. It is possible that it could take managers several quarters to implement changes in their firms' real activities. Rather than speculating as to the length of this implementation period, we examine financing and investing activities for a wide interval surrounding periods of extreme changes in investor recognition.
Empirical results for tests of P4 are presented in there is strong evidence of a positive contemporaneous relation between financing and ΔBREADTH in both the quarterly and annual data. Using quarterly (annual) data, the spread in financing between the high and low ΔBREADTH portfolios in period t is 2.95% (8.58%) with a corresponding t-statistic of 34.4 (42.9). These results are clearly both highly statistically and economically significant. There is also weaker evidence that ΔBREADTH is related to future financing activities. Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the financing data from table 7 for the extreme investor recognition deciles.
The figure clearly shows evidence of a positive relation in period t that gradually fades over the next two years. This evidence suggests that managers respond very quickly to increases in investor recognition, immediately raising new financing. First, the contemporaneous relation between ΔBREADTH and investment is considerably weaker than that for financing. Using quarterly (annual) data, the spread in investment between the high and low ΔBREADTH portfolios is 0.40% (2.70%) with a corresponding tstatistic of 16.3 (32.2). Second, there is much stronger evidence of a positive relation 7 In unreported tests we decompose our financing variable into debt and equity financing and examine how each of these financing components relates to changes in investor recognition. We find that both debt and equity financing exhibit the relations documented for total financing, and that the relations are slightly stronger for debt financing. These results indicate that the relations documented in table 7 are not mechanically related to the increased shares outstanding arising from equity issuances.
between ΔBREADTH and future changes in investment. Panel D of figure 4 illustrates that this positive relation extends for at least 3 years beyond the ΔBREADTH ranking year. The story that emerges from table 7 and figure 4 is that firms immediately raise new financing in response to increases in investor recognition, and then gradually invest the proceeds over the next several years. This story is intuitively appealing, since it indicates that when the cost of capital is relatively low, firms raise enough new financing to cover their investment opportunities for the next several years.
Overall, the results in table 7 confirm that investor recognition is positively related to both financing and investing. In addition to confirming P4, these results provide a potential explanation for why previous research has found that both financing and investing are negatively related to future stock returns (e.g., Ritter, 2003; Titman, Wei and Xie, 2004) . Previous research refers to these results as stock return 'anomalies', because they are difficult to reconcile with market efficiency. The investor recognition hypothesis provides a potential explanation for these anomalies. Merton's model links both financing and investment to contemporaneous changes in investor recognition and provides an explanation as to why investor recognition has a negative relation with expected returns. Financing and investing could simply be proxies for investor recognition, thus explaining their negative relation with future returns. Unfortunately, empirical tests of this conjecture are problematic, because all we have to work with is ΔBREADTH, which is itself a noisy proxy for investor recognition. It is unreasonable to expect ΔBREADTH to completely subsume these other variables in predicting future stock returns. It is likely that each of measures provides incremental information about the underlying investor recognition construct. 
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence suggesting that investor recognition is more important than accounting information in explaining the variation in stock returns.
Consistent with Merton's (1987) theoretical analysis, we find that (i) security value is increasing in investor recognition, (ii) expected return is decreasing in investor recognition, (iii) the above two relations are increasing in a security's idiosyncratic risk, and (iv) financing and investing activities are increasing in investor recognition.
Our research has implications for the large body of existing research on the role of cash flow news versus expected return news in explaining cross-sectional variation in security returns (e.g., Roll, 1988; Campbell, 1991; Vuolteenaho, 2002) . We identify investor recognition as an important determinant of expected return news and we show that changes in investor recognition appear to be as important as earnings surprises in explaining security returns. Our findings suggest that changes in investor recognition should be a particularly important determinant of stock returns for firms with relatively uncertain future payoffs, because idiosyncratic risk is greater in such stocks.
Our research also has implications for the large body of literature documenting 'anomalous' determinants of expected returns. We have already shown that investor recognition is related to financing and investment in such a way that investor recognition provides a potential explanation for the negative returns following these activities.
Investor recognition also has the potential to explain a number of other anomalies. For example, Sloan (1996) and Richardson, Sloan, Soliman and Tuna (2005) show that accruals are negatively related to future returns. Accruals basically represent investments in operating assets, and so increased investor recognition should lead to increased investment in accruals. As a second example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that stock returns are positively autotcorrelated over measurement intervals of 3-12 months.
Since changes in investor recognition are also positively autocorrelated over measurement intervals of 3-12 months, autocorrelation in investor recognition could drive momentum in stock returns. As a final example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find that fundamental to price ratios (e.g., book-to-market, earnings-to-price) are positively related to future stock returns. Increased investor recognition will lead to higher security values and lower expected returns, thus inducing a negative relation between fundamental to price ratios and future returns. The challenge for future research in this area is to determine how much of the return predictability of these 'anomalies' is attributable to investor recognition.
Our research leaves several questions unanswered. Foremost among these are the determinants of investor recognition. What factors cause investors to be cognizant of some securities, but not others? Figure 2 suggests that investors tend to recognize stocks with strong recent price performance. The evidence in table 7 suggests that firms raising new financing engage activities that increase investor recognition. In fact, one can argue that a primary role of investment bankers is to enhance investor recognition of their clients' securities. A second question concerns the measurement investor recognition.
Our ΔBREADTH measure provides one potential proxy that performs well in empirical tests. But this measure has limitations and can likely be improved upon. The application of factor analysis to a broad range on investor recognition proxies offers one potential avenue for improvement.
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Figure 1 Mean Reversion in the Change in Investor Recognition
Table 2 Mean Reversion and Autocorrelations in the Change in Investor Recognition
Panel A provides averages of ∆Breadth QTR in quarters t-4 to t+4 by decile rankings of current quarter ∆Breadth QTR . Panel B reports averages of ∆Breadth ANN from years t-3 to t+3 by decile rankings of current quarter ∆Breadth ANN . Panels C and D provides Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for quarterly and annual changes in investor recognition, respectively. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆Breadth ANN ) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. Table 3 Average
Size-Adjusted Returns by Ranks of Change in Investor Recognition
Panel A reports the average quarterly size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of ∆Breadth QTR in quarters t-4 to t+4. Panel B reports the average annual size-adjusted returns for the top and bottom quarter-t decile rankings of ∆Breadth ANN in years t-3 to t+3. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quarter t+k or year t+k . Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆Breadth ANN ) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are adjusted using the Newey-West correction with four lags.
Panel A: Regressions using seasonally differences in quarterly earnings to measure cash-flow news 1985Q1 to 2004Q4) . Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Quarterly idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the sum over the prior 3 months of monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. The monthly measures equal the sum of the daily squared excess return, which equal the difference between the daily value-weighted industry return and the firm's daily returns. Industry classifications are based on Fama and French (1997) . The idiosyncratic risk measures are ranked each quarter into deciles and the ranks are normalized to range from -.5 to +.5 (denoted Rank i-risk Qtr t ). Change in earnings is computed as the seasonal change in earnings before extraordinary items (data #8) scaled by average total assets. Forecast errors are computed as the actual reported earnings (per I/B/E/S) minus the consensus earnings forecast outstanding prior to the earnings announcement divided by price at the beginning of the period. Annual forecast revision equals the change in the consensus annual earnings forecast between the beginning and the end of the quarter, scaled by price at the beginning of the quarter. Quarterly size-adjusted return is computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during the quarter. Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. 1983Q1-2003Q4) . Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quarter t+k or year t+k . Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. Quarterly (annual) idiosyncratic risk is the square root of the sum over the prior 3 (12) months of monthly idiosyncratic risk measures. The monthly measures equal the sum of the daily squared excess return, which equal the difference between the daily value-weighted industry return and the firm's daily returns. Industry classifications are based on Fama and French (1997) . The idiosyncratic risk measures are ranked each quarter into deciles and the ranks are normalized to range from -.5 to +.5 (denoted Rank i-risk). Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆Breadth ANN ) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. The t-statistics are adjusted using the NeweyWest correction with four lags. 1983Q1-2003Q4) . Our measure of investor recognition, ΔBREADTH t , is decomposed to ΔBREADTH t =IN t -OUT t , where IN t (OUT t ) equals the fraction of 13Ffilers in both period t-1 and period t that have a zero (non-zero) holding in the stock in the prior period and a non-zero (zero) holding in the stock in the current period. Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆Breadth ANN ) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100. Size-adjusted returns are computed as the difference between the return on a firm's size decile portfolio return and the return for the firm during quarter t+k or year t+k . Size portfolios are determined based on decile assignment for all NYSE/AMEX firms. The t-statistics are adjusted using the Newey-West correction with four lags. #44) . Quarterly (annual) investment is calculated as the quarterly (trailing-twelve-months) sum of capital expenditure plus acquisitions, less depreciation and sales of property plant and equipment, scaled by average total assets (Compustat data item (90 + 94 -77 -83)/average 44). Percentage quarterly change in breadth (∆Breadth QTR ) equals the difference in the number of institutions (13F filers) holding the firm's stock at the beginning and at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the beginning of the quarter and multiplied by 100. Percentage annual change in breadth (∆Breadth ANN ) equals the difference in the number of institutions holding the firm's stock at the end of quarter t-4 and at the end of the current quarter divided by the total number of institutions at the end of quarter t-4, and multiplied by 100.
